The newly released National Security Strategy makes one point unmistakably clear: Washington has elevated economic security and the Western Hemisphere to the top tier of its strategic priorities. The document states that the United States will “assert and enforce a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” signaling a full return to hemispheric primacy as the cornerstone of American security.
The force posture guidance reinforces this shift. The strategy calls for “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, and away from theaters whose relative import has declined.” In practical terms, this suggests a future in which long-standing deployments abroad receive fewer resources while more attention and capability are redirected toward challenges closer to home.
What is most notable in the new framework is how China fits within it. The most striking change is what is no longer stated. China is not described as the singular organizing principle of U.S. strategy. There is no reference to a “pacing threat” or a looming existential rivalry. Instead, China appears as a major but not isolated challenge, framed primarily through the lens of economic competition, supply chain risk, and long-term industrial resilience. Yet this reframing should not be mistaken for a retreat from deterrence. The strategy is explicit that preventing Chinese military aggression—particularly across the Taiwan Strait—remains a vital U.S. interest, and that robust deterrence is required to uphold it.
Reading the structure of the strategy, the hierarchy of American priorities looks roughly as follows:
1. Homeland security and border stability
2. Western Hemisphere security and restoration of regional primacy
3. Economic security, especially reindustrialization and control of supply chains
4. China and the Indo-Pacific
China is not reimagined as a partner, but the document presents it as a challenge shaped by structural economic dynamics rather than an imminent geopolitical crisis. At the same time, the strategy emphasizes continuity in core commitments—notably reaffirming the importance of Taiwan’s security and the need to maintain strategic stability in Europe, which the NSS also labels vital to U.S. interests.
One of the broader shifts evident in the strategy is the elevation of what it terms “non-traditional threats” to the same level of strategic importance as great-power competition. Mass migration, foreign influence operations, narcotics networks, and systemic technological theft are framed not as peripheral issues but as decisive forms of modern strategic competition. The NSS argues that adversaries are increasingly adept at exploiting these vectors to weaken the United States internally, and that securing the homeland—economically, informationally, and demographically—is essential for sustaining deterrence and projecting power abroad. In this framing, regional chapters become downstream applications of a central thesis: long-term American strength rests on rebuilding industrial capacity, securing critical economic flows, and reducing domestic vulnerabilities.
Military Balance and the Indo-Pacific
For the first time, the strategy openly acknowledges that the United States could lose military overmatch in the Western Pacific. Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, “ideally by preserving military overmatch,” is labeled a vital interest. The use of “ideally” signals an awareness of shifting military realities rather than a downgrading of Taiwan’s importance. The strategy maintains that preventing a forced unification is a vital American interest and requires strengthened deterrence, improved allied capabilities, and sustained U.S. investment in defense technologies.
The document also warns that if states along the First Island Chain do not make substantial increases in their own defense efforts, the balance of power could shift so far that defending Taiwan becomes “impossible.” Washington reiterates its longstanding opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, but it links that position to the credibility of U.S. military and economic power. Deterrence remains explicit and central.
Economic Competition with China
Competition with China is framed primarily in economic terms. The strategy describes the contest as a race to “win the economic future,” where technological leadership, secure supply chains, and industrial capacity are decisive. Unlike earlier U.S. strategies, economics is not simply one pillar of national power but its foundation—the prerequisite for credible military deterrence, diplomatic leverage, and long-term geopolitical stability.
This context also reframes the role of tariffs. Rather than walking back earlier tariff policies, the NSS treats them as a core instrument of strategic statecraft—tools for reindustrialization, coalition bargaining, supply chain diversification, and protection against predatory economic practices. The objective is not a return to unilateral pressure but the construction of an economic bloc with enough collective weight to shape Beijing’s incentives.
This approach contains an inherent tension. It is difficult to marshal an economic coalition against China while simultaneously pressing allies on trade, demanding higher defense spending, and regularly renegotiating alliance burdens. Partners may eventually pose the central question beneath many of these debates: why should they absorb economic costs to support a United States that appears less willing to extend reciprocal economic benefits and still rebuilding its own industrial competitiveness?